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MR.  CHISICK:  Welcome  to  the  second-to-last  copyright  panel  of  the  afternoon. 
My  name  is  Casey  Chisick.  I’m  a  Partner  at  Cassels  Brock  in  Toronto,  and  I’m  honored, 
if  a  little  confused,  to  have  been  asked  to  moderate  this  panel  on  the  Music 
Modernization  Act  (MMA).  1
For  those  who  are  not  music  copyright  nerds  and  may  not  have  been  paying 
attention,  the  MMA  was  signed  into  law  last  October  after  many  years  of  negotiation, 
legislation,  and  debate.  The  MMA  is  the  first  major  amendment  to  U.S.  copyright  law 
since  the  Digital  Millennium  Copyright  Act  (DMCA),  so  that’s  kind  of  cool.  It’s  actually 
three  statutes  in  one: 
•  The  Musical  Works  Modernization  Act  revamps  the  music  licensing  process  for 
digital  services  by  creating  a  new,  highly  regulated  mechanical  license  collective  (MLC) 
as  a  sort  of  central  clearinghouse,  and  also  revamping  the  rate-setting  process  for  digital 
music. 
•  The  Compensating  Legacy  Artists  for  their  Songs,  Service,  and  Important 
Contributions  to  Society  Act  (CLASSICS)  requires  royalties  to  be  paid  for  the 
performance  of  pre-1972  sound  recordings  used  on  digital  radio. 
•  The  Allocation  for  Music  Producers  Act  (AMP)  requires  part  of  those  royalties 
to  be  distributed  to  producers,  mixers,  and  sound  engineers  who  were  involved  in 
creating  the  sound  recordings. 
There  was  a  fourth  piece.  To  the  surprise  of  no  one,  I  think,  the  Fair  Play  Fair  Pay 
Act,  which  would  have  required  terrestrial  radio  stations  to  pay  royalties  for  public  
2
performance  of  sound  recordings,  didn’t  quite  make  the  cut. 
The  legislation  overall,  despite  its  controversial  nature,  worked  out  pretty  well  in 
the  end.  It  was  passed  unanimously  by  Congress  and  most  of  the  stakeholders  seemed  to 
be  pretty  pleased  with  the  outcome.  The  main  constituencies  —  music  publishers, 
songwriters,  digital  musical  services,  record  labels  —  generally  seemed  pretty  satisfied 
with  the  outcome  as  far  as  I  can  tell. 
Of  course,  the  devil  is  in  the  details,  and  implementation  of  course  will  be  a 
challenge,  and  fissures  have  already  started  to  emerge  as  the  Copyright  Office  considers 
which  of  two  competing  groups  to  designate  as  the  mechanical  licensing  collective. 
Of  course,  there  are  those  who  doubt  that  it  will  ever  be  possible  to  achieve  the 
key  goals  of  the  MMA,  including,  most  importantly,  the  creation  of  a  comprehensive, 
reliable  database  of  musical  works  and  information  on  the  rightsholders  who  own  them. 
Complexity  abounds.  It  will  take  the  music  industry  some  time  to  adjust,  and 
we’ll  see  how  this  all  plays  out.  Fortunately,  Fordham  has  assembled  an  all-star  panel  to 
explore  those  issues. 
1  Orrin  G.  Hatch–Bob  Goodlatte  Music  Modernization  Act,  Pub.  L.  No.  115–264,  132 
Stat.  3676  (2018). 
2  H.R.  1836,  115th  Cong.  (2017). 
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I  want  to  introduce  them.  Professor  Justin  Hughes  from  Loyola  Law  School  is 
going  to  discuss,  among  other  things,  the  opportunities  and  the  challenges  of  the  new 
database.  Professor  Sean  O’Connor  from  the  University  of  Washington  School  of  Law 
will  talk  about  another  perspective  on  the  implementation  and  governance  of  the  new 
mechanical  licensing  system.  Richard  Reimer,  in-house  counsel  at  the  American  Society 
of  Composers,  Authors,  and  Publishers  (ASCAP),  is  going  to  look  at  the  other 
music-licensing  provisions  of  the  MMA  that  affect  performing  rights  as  well  as 
mechanical  rights. 
We  have  our  two  panelists  who  will  provide  reaction  no  doubt,  and  further 
commentary:  Frank  Scibilia,  a  Partner  at  Pryor  Cashman,  and  Ken  Steinthal  from  King  & 
Spalding,  a  Fordham  University  grad.  They  are  both  leading  music  industry  lawyers  who 
have  been  deeply  involved  both  in  the  MMA  itself  and  in  the  run-up  to  it. 
Lots  to  discuss.  Great  people  to  discuss  it.  
Without  further  ado,  I  want  to  invite  Professor  Hughes  to  begin  with  his  remarks. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Thank  you,  Casey.  
If  two  or  three  or  five  years  ago  you  had  asked  an  average  person  in  the  copyright 
community  if  we  would  see  a  law  like  the  Music  Modernization  Act,  I  think  that  member 
of  the  “copyrati”  would  have  been  very  doubtful. 
Indeed,  many  of  you  know  that  over  the  last  few  years  of  his  tenure  Chairman 
Goodlatte  of  the  House  Judiciary  Committee  held  a  wide  variety  of  hearings  on  a 
substantial  revision  of  copyright  law.  I  can  tell  you  that  by  2016  the  congressman’s  staff 
was  thinking  about  an  exit  strategy: How  do  we  extradite  ourselves  from  this  and  not 
seem  embarrassed?  What  can  we  get  done?  There  doesn’t  seem  to  be  much  we  can  get 
done.  Well,  we’ll  say  we  got  the  Defend  Trade  Secrets  Act  done,  so  it  won’t  be  a  total  3
wash  on  intellectual  property .  So  it  was  always  a  tremendous  challenge,  and  for  many 
people  it’s  just  a  wonderful  surprise  how  the  Music  Modernization  Act  turned  out. 
The  comprehensive  database  part,  which  I  want  to  talk  about  most,  is  also  a 
surprise  because  for  many  years  this  idea  has  been  floated.  It  was  floated  many  years  ago 
at  the  WIPO,  where  the  reaction  of  many  of  the  rightsholders  was, That’s  a  really  bad 
idea .  What  might  have  been  a  really  bad  idea  in  Geneva  now  turns  out  to  be  a  really  good 
idea  in  Washington. 
As  Casey  said,  the  Music  Modernization  Act  has  these  three  parts.  In  reverse 
order,  they  are: 
•  Title  III,  the  Allocation  for  Music  Producers,  codifies  a  SoundExchange 
practice  of  distributing  some  of  the  royalties  they  collect  to  sound  engineers,  sound 
mixers,  and  producers.  For  people  who  haven’t  followed  that  carefully,  that  was  kind  of  a 
surprise.  They  were  already  distributing  that  money,  so  it  really  is  just  a  codification  of  a 
practice. 
•  Title  II,  The  CLASSICS  Protection  Act,  which  I  hope  we’ll  talk  more  about. 
•  Title  I,  Music  Licensing  Modernization,  replaces  the  old 
sound-recording-by-sound-recording  compulsory  licensing  for  digital  streaming  services 
with  a  new  blanket  license  for  digital  music  providers  to  make  and  distribute  digital 
3  Defend  Trade  Secrets  Act  of  2016,  34  U.S.C.  41310  (Supp.  V  2018). 
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phonorecord  downloads,  permanent  downloads,  limited  downloads,  and  interactive 
streams. 
As  Casey  said,  this  new  system  requires  the  creation  of  a  new  mechanical 
licensing  collective  that  will  (a)  issue  and  administer  the  blanket  licenses,  (b)  receive  the 
proceeds  of  the  blanket  licenses,  and  (c)  distribute  the  proceeds  to  composers  and  music 
publishers.  To  do  (c),  as  Casey  said,  the  music  licensing  collective  will  need  to  develop 
an  authoritative  database  of  musical  composition  ownership  information  in  relation  to 
sound  recordings.  I  emphasize  that  because  that  makes  it  harder. 
There  is  a  huge  amount  of  stuff  in  the  MMA,  and  I  don’t  claim  to  understand  it 
all,  but  I  want  to  focus  on  the  promise  of  the  blanket  license  and  the  challenge  of  the 
database  project. 
The  promise  of  the  blanket  license.  Generally  speaking,  at  an  event  like  this  you 
learn  from  copyright  owners  that  they  don’t  like  blanket  licenses,  and  they  aren’t 
supposed  to  like  compulsory  licensing  mechanisms.  But,  as  academics  said  in  a  letter  to 
Chairman  Goodlatte  many  months  ago,  “At  present,  the  lack  of  an  authoritative  resource 
for  identifying  copyright  owners  for  musical  compositions  limits  music  licensing 
opportunities  and  impedes  the  prompt  payment  of  songwriter  royalties.”  Now,  that  was 
putting  it  very  politely. 
Under  the  old  system,  when  a  digital  music  provider  wanted  to  exercise  the 
compulsory  license,  it  sent  a  Notice  of  Intention  to  the  copyright  owner;  and  if  they 
couldn’t  find  the  copyright  owner  or  the  owner  was  unknown  or  uncertain,  they  sent  an 
“address  unknown  Notice  of  Intention”  to  the  Copyright  Office,  which  maintains  a  list  of 
these  online.  Noticeably,  the  old  statute  didn’t  say  whether  in  filing  this  address  4
unknown  Notice  of  Intention  you  had  to  do  a  reasonable  or  good-faith  search  for  the 
prospective  licensor  copyright  owner;  all  the  prospective  licensee  needed  to  do  was  a 
Copyright  Office  public  records  search. 
Even  more  importantly,  many  people  interpreted  the  statutory  royalties  provision 
to  mean  that  they  accrued  only  after  the  copyright  owner  had  been  identified.  Spotify  was 
on  record  saying,  “We  hold  on  to  the  royalties  and  we  pay  them  when  the  copyright 
owner  is  found.”  But  many  thought  that  was  not  required  by  the  statute  and  that  a 
prospective  licensee  that  filed  an  address  unknown  Notice  of  Intention  therefore  arguably 
enjoyed  a  period  of  gratis  use  up  until  the  point  when  a  content  owner  came  forward. 
Our  colleagues  at  the  Copyright  Office  will  know  better  than  I,  but  beginning  in 
April  2016  digital  music  services  —  e.g.,  Google,  Pandora,  Spotify  —  began  serving  an 
unprecedented  number  of  address  unknown  Notices  of  Intention  on  the  Copyright  Office. 
Between  April  2016  and  January  2017  they  filed  25  million  address  unknown  Notices  of 
Intention,  meaning  they  claimed  they  could  not  find  these  copyright  owners.  There  are 
scholars  and  commentators,  like  Professor  Kristelia  García  at  the  University  of  Colorado, 
who  believe  that  much  of  that  was  doubtful.  
The  MMA  replaces  that  system  of  Notice  of  Intention  and  will  in  fact  create  a 
blanket  license,  and  the  blanket  license  will  allow  payment  into  this  new  collective.  Of 
course,  payment  into  the  new  collective  is  of  no  use  unless  there  is  a  way  to  distribute  the 
4  See  Section  115  NOIs  Filed  with  the  Copyright  Office,  U.S.  Copyright  Off., 
https://www.copyright.gov/licensing/115/noi-submissions.php. 
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money,  and  distributing  the  money  equitably  and  correctly  requires  an  enormous  amount 
of  work  gathering  this  information. 
We  have  to  be  honest  that  the  database  politics  are  interesting.  An  incomplete 
database  could  work  to  the  financial  benefit  of  different  parties,  and  that  already  is  a 
contentious  point. 
The  new  Section  115(d)(3)(E)  lays  out  the  requirements  of  the  database.  The 
requirements  of  the  database  and  assembling  the  database  are  daunting  because:  
(1)  We  have  to  assemble  all  the  musical  composition  information,  ownership 
information  and  composer  information,  that  is  in  many  different  places,  and  some  of  it  is 
arguably  lost. 
(2)  We  have  to  match  up  that  information  with  the  sound  recordings  in  which  the 
musical  compositions  are  embodied. 
(3)  Even  after  all  that  information  is  collected  from  the  music  publishers  —  often 
who  do  not  have  complete  information  about  composers  that  an  individual  music 
publisher  doesn’t  represent  —  to  do  real  due  diligence  for  the  database  there  will  have  to 
be  a  lot  of  cross-referencing  with  performance  rights  organizations  (PROs)  and,  even  if 
you  talk  to  people  at  SoundExchange,  cross-referencing  with  all  kinds  of  publicly 
available  information  like  MusicBrainz  and  Gracenote  and  All  Access. 
So  the  challenges  of  the  database  are  enormous,  but  we  want  the  database  to  be 
as  complete  and  authoritative  as  possible. 
Lastly  —  as  the  explosions  and  the  cannonade  or  artillery  continue  —  as  we 
continue  to  refine  the  database  and  make  it  more  authoritative  and  bring  all  the 
information  together,  we  will  find  more  and  more  conflicts.  A  lot  of  those  conflicts  will 
be  false  positives  (e.g.  territorial  disputes)  and  we  will  be  able  to  sort  those  out;  but  some 
will  not,  and  that  requires  a  dispute  resolution  mechanism. 
MR.  CHISICK:  I  just  want  to  say  that  explosion  is  very  un-Canadian. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  It’s  America.  What  can  you  expect?  [Laughter]  
MR.  CHISICK:  We  have  five  minutes  for  discussion  of  this  topic.  
I  want  to  start  off  the  discussion  with  a  simple  question  that  I’ll  throw  out  to 
everybody,  not  just  Justin.  Can  this  be  done?  I  mean  this  is  not  a  new  problem.  I  was 
talking  to  somebody  yesterday  who  said,  “The  MMA  is  really  solving  problems  from  the 
1960s,”  and  we’ve  been  talking  about  a  comprehensive  musical  works  database  for  as 
long  as  I’ve  been  practicing  in  the  area,  twenty  years  or  more.  Can  this  be  done?  What 
has  changed  that  makes  now  the  time  for  this  project  to  be  undertaken,  and  undertaken 
successfully? 
PROF.  HUGHES:  In  2015  Spotify  announced  it  was  going  to  do  this,  and  you 
can  still  read  its  press  release  online:  “We  are  going  to  build  a  comprehensive  database.” 
What  has  changed?  First,  the  technology  is  much  better.  Second,  we  now  have  a 
statutory  mandate  and  we  have  agreement  of  all  the  parties  to  engage  in  it.  So  now  it  will 
be  harder  for  people  who  don’t  want  an  incomplete  database  to  hide. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  If  I  can  chime  in  on  that  —  and,  admittedly,  I  have  the 
services’  perspective,  having  represented  many  of  the  digital  music  services  over  the 
years  —  you  referred  to  the  political  reasons  why  there  hasn’t  been  a  public  database  or  a 
comprehensive  database.  From  my  perspective,  the  reason  is  publishers  have  historically 
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benefited  from  a  lack  of  transparency  with  respect  to  ownership.  Spotify  could  never  do 
this  without  the  statute  by  itself  because  there  is  no  resource. 
Just  to  give  you  examples,  for  the  benefit  of  people  who  aren’t  as  close  to  this  as 
we  are,  when  a  sound  recording  hits  the  street,  what  we  call  the  “street  date,”  everybody 
knows  the  artist;  everybody  can  know  the  record  company.  Probably  nobody,  unless 
they’re  a  singer-songwriter,  knows  who  wrote  the  underlying  composition;  and  there  are 
often  multiple  composition  owners  of  the  same  composition. 
So  the  song  hits  the  street.  You’re  Spotify,  you’re  Pandora,  you’re  whoever  you 
are,  broadcast  radio,  and  the  information  is  not  available  through  any  mechanism 
whatsoever  to  know  who  the  owners  of  the  composition  are  of  the  most  popular  music, 
the  music  that  everybody  wants  on  all  these  services.  Therefore,  the  services  cannot 
function  without  the  risk  of  infringement  absent  this  form  of  license. 
It  is  a  tradeoff.  The  publishers  got  a  lot.  The  services  have  to  fund  the  creation  of 
this  database  and  have  to  fund  the  costs  of  the  music  licensing  collective  going  forward. 
To  your  point  about  paying  the  money,  the  services,  in  my  view,  have  always 
been  willing  to  pay  the  money  in  as  long  as  they  can  get  immunity  from  copyright 
infringement  in  return.  That’s  what  the  statute  provides,  the  ability  to  have  a  single-notice 
blanket  license.  The  services  get  their  insurance  against  copyright  infringement  claims  — 
and  there  were  dozens  of  plaintiffs’  class  actions  that  were  benefiting  from  the  cracks  in 
the  system  under  the  old  Section  115  license. 
That’s  the  core  tradeoff,  and  I  think  that’s  where  everybody  got  what  they  really 
wanted.  The  publishers  got  a  system  that  the  services  pay  for.  The  services  got  immunity 
from  all  these  class  actions. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  But  not  only  is  the  information  not  available  when  the  music 
hits  the  street,  it  may  not  be  finalized.  The  ownership  shares  of  compositions  may  not 
have  been  determined  yet. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  That’s  why  I  used  the  new-release  example.  It’s  not  known. 
The  writers  often  don’t  agree  on  their  splits  until  weeks  or  months  later.  You  look  at  a 
song  like  “Uptown  Funk,”  which  had  more  than  ten  writers,  and  there’s  no  way  those 
writers  had  agreed  on  their  splits  when  the  song  hit  the  street.  So  there  are  inherent 
problems  with  new  releases. 
And  then  there  is  the  fact  that  composition  ownership  changes  over  the  years. 
There  is  no  resource  where  you  can  go  to  find  out  whether  the  original  owner  still  owns 
the  rights  or  has  transferred  them  to  someone  else. 
MR.  CHISICK:  I  want  to  let  Frank  weigh  in  before  we  run  out  of  time  for  this 
round. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  I’m  coming  from  the  copyright  owner  perspective.  Just  as  a 
caveat,  I  do  represent  one  of  the  two  competing  entities  that  are  seeking  to  be  designated 
as  the  collective. 
MR.  CHISICK:  Oh,  we’ll  get  to  that. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  My  views  are  my  own  and  not  necessarily  the  views  of  this 
entity. 
I  think  the  database  and  the  whole  system  will  work.  I’m  very  positive  about  it. 
The  reason  I’m  positive  about  it  is  because  I  think  the  incentives  are  now  in  the  right 
place. 
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I  believe  that,  to  some  degree,  copyright  law  has  been  turned  on  its  head.  It  used 
to  be  that  if  you  wanted  to  exploit  something,  you  had  to  go  out  and  find  the  owner  of  it, 
license  it,  and  then  exploit  it.  Historically,  in  this  digital-streaming  environment  that 
hasn’t  been  the  case  because  digital  services,  and  record  companies  to  some  extent,  want 
to  get  sound  recordings  on  the  digital  streaming  services  as  quickly  as  possible,  and 
sometimes  before  clearing  the  publishing  rights. 
This  really  wasn’t  a  big  problem  for  the  services  for  a  long  period  of  time 
because  they  were  content,  when  they  didn’t  know  who  to  pay,  to  just  hold  the  money. 
That  was  until  they  started  getting  sued  in  class  action  lawsuits,  and  then  they  all  of  a 
sudden  started  thinking, Gee,  this  might  be  a  problem.  Let’s  try  to  see  how  we  can  solve 
this.  
One  method  the  services  used  to  try  to  avoid  legal  exposure  was  to  serve  bulk 
NOIs  on  the  Copyright  Office.  The  bulk  NOIs  may  or  may  not  have  given  the  services 
legal  coverage  —  one  can  ask  whether  the  statutory  requirement  to  make  a  good-faith 
effort  to  identify  the  rights  owner  was  complied  with  —  but  that  still  did  not  get  the 
royalties  into  the  hands  of  the  correct  musical  works  rights  owners.  
Now,  with  the  MMA,  the  tasks  of  matching  and  identification  rest  with  the 
collective,  which  has  the  most  incentive  to  do  it  correctly.  The  collective  has  to  be 
established  by  copyright  owners,  it  has  to  be  managed  and  run  by  copyright  owners,  and 
the  copyright  owners  have  the  incentive  to  make  sure  that  the  correct  copyright  owners 
are  paid.  
I  know  that  at  least  the  MLC,  which  is  one  of  the  two  entities  seeking  designation 
as  the  collective,  has  the  incentive  and  wants  to  do  all  it  can  to  make  as  many  matches  as 
possible,  have  as  thorough  and  complete  a  database  as  possible,  to  pay  the  correct  rights 
owners  and  to  reduce  the  amount  of  unclaimed  or  unallocated  royalties  to  as  close  to  zero 
as  possible.  
But,  of  course,  the  only  way  the  collective  can  fulfill  this  mission  is  if  it  is 
adequately  staffed  and  funded,  which  is  an  issue  that  I  know  Kenny  has  flagged  for 
discussion.  
MR.  CHISICK:  We’ll  pick  that  up  after  Sean’s  presentation.  Sean  is  going  to  talk 
more  about  the  implementation  and  governance  of  the  collective,  so  it’s  a  good  segue. 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  Absolutely.  Good.  
I’m  going  to  be  coming  at  it  from  a  perspective  of  somebody  who  does  a  lot  of 
company  formation.  I’m  a  professor,  but  I  have  also  practiced  for  a  long  time.  I  do  a  lot 
with  startup  companies,  with  governance  of  large  nonprofits,  and  things  as  well.  My 
comments  may  seem  very  small  and  pedantic,  but  this  is  the  kind  of  stuff  I  worry  about 
when  I’m  wearing  my  lawyer  hat.  I  also  had  zero  role  in  anything  going  on  with  MMA, 
so  there  might  be  really  easy  obvious  answers  to  the  things  I’m  going  to  point  out. 
When  the  statute  was  finalized  and  came  out  and  I  read  through  the  gory  details 
about  the  entity  and  the  database,  I  was  really  shocked  at  how  much  detail  about  the 
governance  was  baked  into  the  statute.  I  think  that’s  normally  not  a  great  idea  because,  in 
other  words,  whatever  entity  wants  to  be  designated,  if  it  is  a  preexisting  entity,  it’s  going 
to  already  have  to  comply  with  it.  For  example,  weird  stuff,  like  saying  what  has  to  be  in 
the  bylaws,  a  lot  of  the  stuff  that’s  required  to  be  in  the  bylaws  about  a  staggered  board  is 
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pretty  standard,  and  the  entities  that  are  jockeying  for  position  in  this  probably  have  that 
anyway;  but,  if  they  don’t,  they  are  going  to  have  to  revise  their  bylaws. 
The  bylaws  have  to  be  made  public.  But  who  cares  about  that  because  if  you  are 
setting  up  an  entity,  you  could  put  all  the  stuff  in  the  charter  instead?  Maybe  you  say, 
“Well,  the  charter  under  state  law  has  to  be  nominally  public.” 
It  seems  weird  to  me.  Again,  maybe  somebody  —  maybe  Justin  —  has  a  really 
easy  explanation  for  this.  But  I  found  it  very  odd  that  so  many  details  for  governance 
were  baked  into  the  statute. 
Then,  at  the  same  time  while  we’re  looking  at  that,  there  are  other  things  that 
look  odd  to  somebody  who  sets  up  entities.  
It’s  really  odd  that  a  lot  of  the  boards,  the  voting  members  themselves  on  all  these 
different  boards,  are  even  numbers.  Anyone  who  sets  up  companies  knows  that’s  a 
terrible  idea  because  you  get  deadlocks.  You  always  set  it  up  as  an  odd  number  —  three, 
five,  whatever.  In  the  case  of  the  overall  governance  with  the  fourteen  voting  members, 
don’t  be  fooled.  It  says  fourteen  voting  members  and  three  nonvoting  members,  so  you 
get  seventeen.  But  the  nonvoting  members  are  nonvoting,  so  that  doesn’t  matter,  and  you 
still  could  have  a  deadlock  with  fourteen.  If  the  voting  members  are  ten  publishers  and 
four  professional  songwriters,  there’s  probably  not  going  to  be  a  problem  there. 
But  then,  if  you  go  down  further,  the  Unclaimed  Royalties  Oversight  Committee 
will  have  five  copyright  owners  and  five  songwriters.  As  a  total  outsider,  I  think  that’s  a 
little  weird.  If  those  two  groups  get  adversarial  with  each  other,  you  are  completely 
relying  on  being  able  to  peel  off  somebody  from  the  opposing  camp.  That  can  happen; 
but,  as  somebody  who  is  also  involved  in  dispute  resolution  knows,  when  governance 
goes  bad  it  can  be  hard  to  do  that. 
So,  there  are  a  lot  of  problems  with  the  governance  requirements.  
Another  one  is  the  Mechanical  Licensing  Operations  Advisory  Committee,  which 
has  no  fewer  than  six  and  it’s  equal  between  copyright  owners  and  digital  music 
providers.  It  seems  like  that’s  a  tension  right  there  as  well. 
While  I  love  the  idea  of  this,  I  think  there  are  a  lot  of  problems  that  are  going  to 
emerge  as  this  gets  implemented. 
Looking  at  the  database  itself,  I  think  one  of  the  problems  is  that  we  want  to  set 
up  all  this  information  that  will  then  be  tagged  saying,  “Here  are  some  sound  recordings 
and  here’s  the  information  behind  them,”  but  with  no  real  sense  behind  all  of  this  that 
digital  sound  recordings  have  to  have  metadata  incorporated  into  them.  That  makes  it 
even  harder. 
One  thing  that  I  have  been  trying  to  promote  —  I  know  it  may  be  an  unpopular 
idea  with  some  —  is  that  it  may  be  time  to  suggest  or  try  to  mandate  that  the  digital 
music  service  providers  only  do  trade  in  downloads  and  streaming  of  files  that  actually 
have  uncorrupted  metadata  that  contains  all  this  database  information.  If  you  are  saying 
all  this  information  is  what  will  identify  it  in  the  database,  it  should  be  in  the  files 
themselves. 
My  other  concern  then  is  that,  as  we’ve  just  heard,  the  onus  is  on  the  copyright 
owners  to  identify  the  sound  recordings  that  their  songs  have  been  mechanically 
reproduced  in.  Some  of  the  stuff  you  will  be  able  to  find  through  Harry  Fox  because  if 
somebody  used  the  Harry  Fox  system  to  do  the  mechanical  reproduction  that  information 
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is  there.  But  there’s  a  lot  of  stuff  on  the  street  that  is  just  dubious;  it  didn’t  necessarily  go 
through  Harry  Fox;  it’s  just  somebody  made  a  sound  recording  and  there  is  no  metadata 
in  it  at  all. 
I  was  one  of  the  people  who  used  Apple  iTunes  a  number  of  years  ago  when  they 
did  that  weird  “swap  in  the  iCloud”  thing.  I  had  recordings  that  I  had  bought  and  ripped 
—  I  guess  that  was  legal  —  and  they  replaced  it,  but  it  wasn’t  even  with  the  original 
artist.  So  now  I  have  a  sound  recording  that  I  don’t  even  know  who  the  artist  was  but  I 
know  who  the  composer  was  supposed  to  be. 
I  used  to  be  a  professional  songwriter  myself.  Even  some  of  my  stuff  got  lost, 
like  my  own  recordings  that  I  had  put  into  iTunes  myself,  meaning  stuff  I  owned, 
recorded  in  a  studio  on  my  own,  and  that  went  into  the  ether  in  a  weird  way. 
The  onus  really  has  to  be,  on  not  just  the  copyright  owners  and  songwriters  trying 
to  identify  their  stuff,  but  also  on  the  other  side,  meaning  that  we  can’t  be  trafficking  in 
digital  downloads  or  streaming  in  stuff  that  has  no  metadata.  Maybe  that  goes  off  the  grid 
—  well,  not  literally  off  the  grid  —  to  pirate  sites  and  things  where  you  know  you  are 
getting  essentially  counterfeit  stuff. 
I  am  going  to  end  a  little  early  because  I  just  wanted  to  set  this  up  and  get  the 
debate  going. 
MR.  CHISICK:  I  think  you  succeeded  in  doing  that.  
I  want  to  pick  up  on  that  suggestion.  I  heard  Kenny  huffing  and  puffing  the 
whole  time. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  The  notion  that  the  services  can  solve  that  problem  is  absurd. 
The  services  get  the  data  from  the  record  companies.  The  record  companies  give  them  a 
feed  and  that  has  whatever  metadata  the  labels  have. 
If  you  are  talking  about  pirate  websites,  fine.  That’s  not  who  I  represent  and 
that’s  not  what  the  MMA  is  all  about.  The  MMA  is  trying  to  solve  a  problem  for  the 
companies  that  are  generating  dozens  of  millions  of  dollars  in  royalties.  It  is  meant  to 
encourage  them  to  keep  paying  and  to  get  the  money  to  the  writers  and  the  publishers. 
So  I  don’t  think  it’s  fair  to  say  that  the  services  should  somehow  come  up  with  a 
mechanism  to  get  metadata  when  they  are  reliant  on  the  labels  in  the  first  instance  for  the 
very  metadata  they  have  to  get. 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  I’m  not  saying  they  have  to  get  it,  because  I  agree  that’s 
hard.  I’m  saying  that  they  shouldn’t  stream  it.  If  something’s  on  YouTube  —  and  I’ve 
heard  some  recordings  —  you  get  on  the  list  if  you  look  for  a  certain  song,  and,  as 
somebody  who’s  a  musician,  I’m  thinking, I  don’t  know  who  the  heck  is  performing  that 
song.  That’s  just  a  weird  recording. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  We  can  go  back  to  DMCA  panel  on  that.  If  people  don’t  like 
the  fact  that  there’s  a  safe  harbor  for  user-generated  content,  that’s  a  different  issue  than 
this  issue,  which  is  just  coming  up  with  a  better  system  for  the  main  players  of  audio 
streaming  to  pay  money  in  and  get  the  money  back  out. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  But  we  are  not  talking  about  user-generated  content.  We  are 
talking  about  a  service  like  Spotify;  and  we  are  not  talking  about  major  record  labels  that 
are  presumably  providing  their  metadata.  
MR.  STEINTHAL:  First  time  ever  we  agree. 
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MR.  SCIBILIA:  We’re  talking  about  Spotify  rushing  to  put  stuff  up  on  Spotify, 
something  that  Spotify  doesn’t  know  but  perhaps  should  know  is  really  not  authorized  or 
not  really  licensed  and  doesn’t  have  metadata. 
MR.  CHISICK:  Is  this  really  about  the  professionalization  of  metadata  and  the 
professionalization  of  the  services,  saying  that  the  services  should  traffic  only  in  content 
that  rises  to  a  certain  standard  of  metadata? 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  Yes.  Think  about  if  you  are  a  coffee  company  and  you  are 
selling  coffee  that  is  “fair  trade  certified.”  There  are  ways  that  we  do  that. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  But  it’s  also  about  making  sure  the  independent  artistic 
community  eventually  gets  tools  to  put  the  metadata  into  their  digital  files. 
MR.  CHISICK:  But  those  tools  exist,  don’t  they? 
PROF.  HUGHES:  I  wanted  to  talk  about  something  else,  Sean.  
Sean  was  talking  about  the  structure  of  the  boards.  What  he  didn’t  say  is 
everyone  should  know  there  has  been  a  little  bit  of  a  ruckus  in  Washington  that  the  two 
boards  proposed  by  the  two  contenders  are  all  white,  and  it  has  been  certainly  observed 
by  the  artistic  community,  which  is  not  all  white,  that  the  boards  are  totally  lacking  in 
diversity  at  this  point.  That  raises  big  issues  because  a  lot  of  African  American  artists  and 
a  lot  of  Latino  artists  feel  they  have  been  especially  screwed  by  the  music  industry.  All 
artists  feel  screwed,  but  the  minority  artists  feel  especially  screwed.  To  have  the  really 
bad  appearance  that  the  boards  of  these  proposed  contenders  for  the  MLC  totally  lack 
diversity  was  just  politically  tone-deaf. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  I  will  just  say  that  there  has  been  some  misinformation  about 
that.  The  MLC’s  board  members  were  selected  in  an  open  and  competitive  process  by 
panels  of  well-respected  songwriters  and  independent  music  publishers.  My 
understanding  is  that  in  selecting  the  MLC  board  these  panels  did  consider  diversity, 
among  many  other  criteria,  including  relevant  experience  and  diversity  of  music  genre, 
and  that  the  MLC  board  as  constituted  is  somewhat  diverse.  It’s  not,  as  you  stated,  an 
“all-white”  board. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Do  you  want  to  tell  us  about  the  details  of  “somewhat” 
diversity? 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  The  MLC’s  submission  to  the  Copyright  Office,  which  is 
publicly  available,  identifies  all  of  the  board  members  and  provides  biographical 
information  for  each.  The  MLC  board  represents  a  wide  diversity  of  musical  styles  and  5
creators  of  all  backgrounds  and  it  includes  racially,  ethnically,  and  gender  diverse 
members. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Out  of  how  many? 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  As  per  the  statute,  there  are  fourteen  voting  and  three  non-voting 
board  members. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Okay. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  Of  course  diversity  should  always  be  a  consideration. 
MR.  CHISICK:  There  are  a  lot  of  questions  about  the  composition  of  the  boards. 
The  ruckus  is  not  just  about  diversity.  There  are  all  sorts  of  ruckus  about  conflicts  of 
5  See  Frank  P.  Scibilia  &  Benjamin  K.  Semel,  MLC  Comments  in  Reply  to  the 
Designation  Proposal  of  the  American  Music  Licensing  Collective,  Inc. , 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2018-0011-0031 . 
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interest  or  the  appearance  of  conflicts  of  interest,  and  I  want  to  get  into  that  and  have  a 
conversation  about  it. 
Justin,  do  you  have  a  view  on  the  composition  of  the  board  apart  from  the 
diversity  issue? 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Not  on  the  composition  of  the  board.  And  I  acknowledge  that 
once  a  contender  is  chosen  to  be  the  MLC  —  and  I  keep  saying  MLC  because  I  don’t 
know  why  we  keep  saying  “mechanical  licensing  collective”  for  a  world  of  digital 
downloads  and  digital  streaming.  I  think  that  is  really  bizarre.  So,  “the  collective.”  The 
board  of  the  collective  will  be  reconstituted,  as  I  understand  it,  once  a  contender  is  chosen 
to  be  the  collective. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  It  may  or  may  not  be. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Hopefully,  it  would  reflect  some  of  these  concerns.  But  again, 
that’s  one  issue  where  completeness  of  data  in  the  database  and  the  overarching  goal  of 
the  database  and  its  success  —  the  more  it  is  complete,  the  more  it  is  authoritative,  the 
more  the  controversies  are  worked  out. 
This  goes  to  an  issue  of  what  are  called  “black  box”  royalties. 
MR.  CHISICK:  We’ll  come  to  the  black  box  royalties  “after  this,”  as  they  say  on 
TV. 
We  are  going  to  shift  gears  for  a  moment.  Richard,  coming  from  ASCAP,  gives 
us  a  good  opportunity  to  highlight  that  the  MMA  may  be  substantially  about  mechanical 
licensing,  but  it’s  not  only  about  mechanical  licensing.  I  want  to  shift  gears  a  little  bit  and 
talk  about  the  performing  rights  aspects  of  the  MMA. 
MR.  REIMER:  Thanks,  Casey.  
I  think  everybody  knows  that  ASCAP  and  Broadcast  Music,  Inc.  (BMI)  are  two 
performing  rights  organizations,  two  of  the  four  in  the  United  States  today,  but  the  only 
two  that  are  governed  by  consent  decrees.  The  consent  decrees  have  been  in  place  for  6
seventy-plus  years. 
The  MMA  achieves  some  modification  of  the  consent  decree  process.  I  want  to 
give  a  very  brief  recitation  of  the  history  that  got  us  to  the  MMA.  
From  2000–2010  ASCAP  principally,  but  BMI  as  well,  were  involved  in  a  large 
number  of  Rate  Court  proceedings  with  digital  music  services  and  others  in  the  digital 
space.  There  was  a  great  deal  of  dissatisfaction  among  our  members  and  BMI  affiliates 
with  the  outcomes  of  those  litigations,  to  the  point  where  the  major  music  publishers 
asked  the  performing  rights  organizations  to  change  their  rules  to  permit  so-called 
“digital  rights  withdrawals”  so  that  they  could  license  directly  in  this  space. 
That  led  to  ASCAP  and  BMI  ultimately  going  to  the  Department  of  Justice  in 
2014,  following  decisions  that  effectively  prevented  those  digital  withdrawals.  In  2014 
we  asked  for  modification  of  the  decrees.  That  led  to  the  so-called  “fractional  licensing 
debate.”  
Ultimately,  in  August  2016  the  Department  of  Justice  issued  a  closing  letter 
saying  that  they  would  not  agree  to  modify  the  decrees  and  they  thought  that  there  should 
6  United  States  vs.  ASCAP,  No.  41-1395  (WCC),  2001  WL  1589999  (S.D.N.Y.  Jun.  11, 
2001);  United  States  v.  BMI,  No.  64  CIV.  3787,  1994  WL  901652  (S.D.N.Y.  Nov.  18,  1994). 
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be  100  percent  licensing;  that  is  to  say,  ASCAP  and  BMI  would  have  to  license  the  entire 
work  even  if  they  didn’t  control  all  of  the  interests  in  the  work.  7
That  was  really  the  run-up  to  the  MMA.  What  we  see  in  the  MMA  —  and  I  think 
Casey  alluded  to  this  earlier  —  are  three  provisions  that  deal  with  performing  rights 
licensing.  
One  deals  with  reform  of  the  consent  decrees  themselves.  The  only  way  that 
consent  decrees  can  be  modified  is  by  agreement  with  the  Department  of  Justice 
approved  by  the  courts  that  administer  the  consent  decrees,  currently  Judge  Cote  for 
ASCAP  and  Judge  Stanton  for  BMI,  both  sitting  in  the  Southern  District  of  New  York. 
The  MMA  provides  that  if  the  government  and  the  parties  agree  on  changes, 
before  those  changes  can  be  implemented  Congress  must  be  involved.  The  Department  of 
Justice  must  notify  the  chairs  and  ranking  members  of  the  Judiciary  Committees  in  the 
House  and  the  Senate,  and  presumably  Congress  would  have  an  opportunity  to  have 
hearings  on  any  proposed  revisions  in  the  consent  decrees. 
The  other  two  provisions  in  MMA  deal  with  the  Rate  Court  process  itself.  
There  was  a  perception,  I  think  on  both  sides,  users  and  the  PROs,  that  there  was 
the  ability  to  game  the  system,  in  the  sense  that  one  could  select  which  judge  they 
thought  would  be  more  suitable  to  the  goals  of  a  particular  user  or  one  of  the  societies  in 
a  Rate  Court  proceeding.  As  a  result,  the  MMA  has  a  provision  that  requires  any  Rate 
Court  proceeding  to  be  conducted  by  a  judge  chosen  at  random  in  the  Southern  District  of 
New  York.  It  cannot  be  the  consent  decree  judge  for  either  ASCAP  or  BMI. 
Finally,  there  is  a  provision  that  deals  with  the  standards  by  which  the  rates  can 
be  determined.  The  MMA  permits  the  use  of  results  in  proceedings  involving  sound 
recording  performance  rights  but  only  for  digital  service  providers. 
As  to  where  we  wind  up  with  the  MMA,  some  of  you  may  know  that  last  year 
Makan  Delrahim  became  the  Head  of  the  Department  of  Justice  Antitrust  Division.  He 
announced  that  he  was  intent  on  reviewing  all  consent  decrees,  not  obviously  just  the 
ASCAP  and  BMI  decrees.  This  has  provided  an  incentive,  I  think,  for  not  only  ASCAP 
and  BMI  but  also  the  user  community  to  advocate  for  further  changes  in  the  consent 
decrees. 
Congress  has  already  jumped  in.  There  have  been  meetings  with  staff  of  the 
Judiciary  Committee  on  the  Senate  side,  and  the  users  and  the  PROs  have  made 
suggestions. 
ASCAP  and  BMI  issued  a  joint  open  letter  on  February  28  announcing  that  their  8
goals  in  terms  of  reform  of  the  consent  decrees  include:  
•  First,  sunset  of  the  decrees.  We  recognize  that  this  reform  is  going  to  take  place 
over  a  period  of  time.  As  a  transition  to  the  elimination  of  the  decrees  ultimately,  we  have 
proposed  that  the  automatic  license  granted  by  the  consent  decrees  —  anyone  who  writes 
and  applies  for  a  license  is  entitled  to  a  license  immediately  —  would  continue. 
7  United  States  Department  of  Justice,  Statement  of  the  Department  of  Justice  on  the 
Closing  of  the  Antitrust  Division’s  Review  of  the  ASCAP  and  BMI  Consent  Decrees  (Aug.  4, 
2016),  https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/882101/download. 
8  BMI  President  &  CEO  Mike  O’Neill  and  ASCAP  CEO  Elizabeth  Matthews  Issue  Open 
Letter  to  the  Industry  on  Consent  Decree  Reform,  ASCAP  (Feb.  28,  2019), 
https://www.ascap.com/press/2019/02/02-28-ascap-bmi-announcement. 
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•  There  ought  to  be  a  mechanism  for  immediate  payment  of  interim  license  fees.  
•  The  Rate  Court  process  would  continue  over  the  period  before  the  termination 
of  the  decrees.  
•  ASCAP  and  BMI  would  continue  to  obtain  only  nonexclusive  rights  so  that 
members  and  users  can  enter  into  direct  licenses. 
•  Any  reform  of  the  decrees  would  continue  the  current  forms  of  license  that  are 
currently  available  —  the  blanket  license,  the  program  license,  and  adjustable-fee 
licenses. 
That’s  where  we  are  at  this  point. 
MR.  CHISICK:  There  are  two  competing  presumptions  here.  The  MMA  relies  on 
the  presumption  that  regulation  is  necessary.  Both  on  the  mechanical  side  and  the 
performing  rights  side  it  is  still  necessary  to  regulate  the  royalties  paid  to  songwriters. 
I  couldn’t  help  but  notice,  Richard,  that  you  very  casually  referred  to  the 
transition  “to  the  termination  of  the  decrees,”  as  though  that’s  a  foregone  conclusion,  or  at 
least  a  foregone  conclusion  in  the  PROs’  minds. 
The  question  is,  is  there  or  isn’t  there  a  need  for  regulation  of  songwriter  royalties 
in  2019? 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  The  answer  is  absolutely  yes.  The  reason  why  the  provision 
was  put  in  the  MMA  that  requires  the  Justice  Department  to  report  to  Congress  if  the 
Justice  Department  takes  steps  to  sunset  the  decrees  is  because  they  had  spent  more  than 
a  year  developing  a  solution  that  would  allow  a  smooth-functioning  licensing 
marketplace  for  digital  music  services  in  a  fashion  where  the  publishers  and  the 
composers  would  get  all  the  money  upfront  and  build  a  database  to  distribute  it. 
Of  course,  digital  streaming  services  are  engaged  in  distributions  of  music  that 
implicate  both  the  public  performance  right  and  the  mechanical  right.  So  Congress, 
having  fixed  the  problem  on  the  mechanical  right  component,  did  so  assuming  that  the 
public  performance  rights  licensing  marketplace  would  remain  largely  efficient  and 
functioning. 
The  underlying  problem  is  still  there.  If  you  take  away  the  ASCAP  and  BMI 
consent  decrees  and  you  take  away  the  effective  compulsory  licensing  thereunder,  then 
you  are  back  where  you  were  before,  with  no  smoothly  functioning  mechanism  for  the 
rights  to  be  cleared. 
MR.  CHISICK:  But  what’s  curious  is  that  the  United  States  is  somewhat  unique 
in  the  fact  that  there  is  still  a  compulsory  licensing  system  in  the  first  place.  That’s  hardly 
in  vogue. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  We  are  also  unique  in  we’re  the  only  civilized  country  with 
statutory  damages  of  up  to  $150,000  per  work  infringed. 
MR.  CHISICK:  Okay.  Fair  point. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  It’s  the  elephant  in  the  closet.  In  every  other  country,  if  you 
infringe,  especially  if  you  are  doing  your  best  to  get  licenses  and  you  don’t  get  some 
because  it’s  hard  to  do  it,  your  damages  are  going  to  be  essentially  what  the  licensing  fee 
would  have  been  and  perhaps  the  costs  of  the  suit. 
MR.  CHISICK:  No,  no,  no,  no,  no. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  Canada  has  some  degree  of  a  statutory  license.  Other  than  the 
United  States  and  Canada,  nowhere  else.  That’s  the  bludgeoning  that  the  publishers  and 
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the  record  companies  have  used  over  the  years,  the  club  of  potential  damages  of  $150,000 
per  work.  I  bet  you  a  lot  of  the  services  would  trade  off  no  compulsory  licensing  for  no 
statutory  damages  in  a  heartbeat. 
MR.  CHISICK:  Frank,  I  saw  you  moving  around  back  there. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  Do  you  ever  wonder  why  songwriters  are  the  most  regulated 
profession  in  the  United  States?  Why  do  we  need  to  regulate  the  income  of  songwriters?  
MR.  STEINTHAL:  We  need  to  find  them.  We  need  to  have  a  mechanism  for  the 
information  to  be  available.  
MR.  SCIBILIA:  We  are  now  talking  about  paying  them.  In  terms  of  paying  them, 
we  are  talking  about  statutory  provisions  enacted  back  in  the  days  when  there  was  the 
Aeolian  manufacturer  of  piano  rolls  and  the  government  was  concerned  that  it  was  going 
to  corner  the  market  on  music  by  getting  exclusive  licenses  to  use  the  music  in  piano 
rolls. 
MR.  CHISICK:  I  was  concerned  no  one  was  going  to  mention  piano  rolls  in  this 
panel. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  It’s  a  hundred  years  later,  and  the  beneficiaries  of  the 
compulsory  license  and  the  consent  decrees  are  Google  and  Apple  and  Amazon.  They 
don’t  need  protection  in  negotiating  with  songwriters. 
In  terms  of  antitrust  issues,  as  I  think  Mr.  Delrahim  has  said,  if  there  are  antitrust 
concerns,  if  somebody  is  acting  as  an  antitrust  violator  —  as  Ken  knows  because  he’ll  go 
out  and  sue  them  as  he  sued  the  Society  of  European  Stage  Authors  and  Composers 
(SESAC)  —  you  could  bring  a  private  right  of  action  and  you  can  get  the  Department  of 
Justice  to  get  involved. 
But  why  do  we  need  to  have  the  rates  regulated?  Today,  in  the  year  2019,  I  think 
that  is  an  anomaly. 
MR.  CHISICK:  Sean? 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  We  have  small  independent  photographers;  why  is  that  not 
the  same  situation?  We  have  lots  of  areas  in  copyright  where  the  creators  are  smaller, 
independent  “indie”  players,  and  we  don’t  have  them  regulated  under  consent  decrees. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  Bars  and  nightclubs  absolutely  benefit  from  the  ASCAP  and 
BMI  compulsory  licenses.  
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  But  they  could  still  get  blanket  licenses. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  Wait  a  minute,  wait  a  minute.  There’s  no  way  in  the  world 
that  general  licensees  could  effectively  get  licenses  for  all  the  music  that  plays  in  their 
establishments  absent  an  effective  compulsory  license.  There’s  just  no  way. 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  What  about  SESAC  and  the  others  who  are  not  part  of  the 
consent  decree? 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  Well,  SESAC  was  sued  under  the  antitrust  laws  and  agreed  to 
thirty  years  of  arbitration  and  an  effective  compulsory  license  under  that  settlement 
agreement. 
MR.  REIMER:  Not  for  bars  and  restaurants. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  No,  not  for  bars  and  restaurants.  
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  I  have  actually  represented  bars  and  restaurants  who  were 
being  approached  by  SESAC.  Now  there  are  other  PROs  out  there.  When  I  talk  to  the 
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local  bar  owners  in  Seattle,  they  ask  me,  “What  the  heck  do  we  do?  Now  we’ve  got  a 
bunch  of  them.” 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  They  need  it.  
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  But  they  are  not  doing  it  in  the  same  way.  BMI  and  ASCAP 
are  under  the  consent  decrees  but  the  other  PROs  are  not.  We’ve  got  to  open  up  the 
market. 
MR.  REIMER:  Your  clients  are  going  to  get  licenses,  right?  They  are  not  going 
to  risk  being  sued  by  anybody.  Then  it  just  becomes  a  matter  of  negotiating  the  rates.  You 
can  negotiate  in  other  industries.  Why  can’t  you  negotiate  in  this  one? 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  I  think,  especially  when  you  get  to  the  general  licensees,  they 
are  absolutely  without  a  mechanism  to  fairly  assess  whose  music  they  are  using  and  how 
much  to  pay  for  it.  Whatever  the  PRO  says  they  want  to  get,  what  are  they  going  to  do? 
They  just  have  to  pay  whatever  it  is  the  PRO  says  they  should  pay. 
MR.  REIMER:  There  is  something  called  the  NRA  —  not  the  National  Rifle 
Association  but  the  National  Restaurant  Association  —  and  they  refuse  to  come  to  the 
table  to  negotiate. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  I  would  also  draw  a  distinction  between  general  licenses  and 
digital  streaming  services,  as  we  tried  to  do  when  the  publishers  wanted  to  withdraw 
digital  rights  from  ASCAP  and  BMI.  Even  if  the  consent  decrees  are  sunset,  the  PROs  do 
serve  a  very  valuable  purpose,  including  the  general  licensing  of  bars  and  clubs,  because 
they  are  dispersed  throughout  the  country  and  it’s  hard  to  license  them  all. 
But  Google  and  Apple  already  enter  into  direct  licenses.  They  need  all  sorts  of 
rights,  so  they  enter  into  direct  licenses  with  those  same  companies  that  they  can  get  all 
the  rights  from,  including  mechanical  rights  and  including  performance  rights,  and  they 
can  negotiate  those  in  the  free  market.  I  don’t  see  why  we  have  to  separate  out  certain 
rights  that  are  negotiated  freely  and  other  rights  that  are  not  negotiated  freely. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  I  will  go  back  to  the  easy  example  of  the  new  releases,  which 
is  the  lifeblood  of  the  services  that  are  distributing  music,  like  Spotify,  like  Amazon,  like 
Google  Play.  You  cannot  get  licenses  for  information  that  is  not  available  in  the  market. 
Therefore,  they  would  be  at  risk  for  every  new  release  that  they  played  if  they  didn’t  have 
a  license  for  it.  And  how  do  you  get  a  license  for  something  that  doesn’t  yet  exist  —  i.e., 
a  copyright  owner  who  steps  forward  and  says,  “I  own  the  rights  to  this  composition?” 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  Where  does  the  recording  come  from?  Does  somebody  give  it  to 
you?  Does  somebody  say,  “Hey,  here’s  my  sound  recording;  put  it  on  Spotify”?  Shouldn’t 
I  ask,  “Who  are  you?  Do  I  have  the  right  to  license  that  from  you?”  That's  the  way  it  has 
traditionally  been  done. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  I  wish  the  sound  recording  companies  would  convey  the 
rights.  In  a  normal  marketplace  —  and  this  is  the  way  mechanical  rights  were  cleared 
before  —  in  the  old  physical  day,  the  sound  recording  companies  cleared  all  the  rights, 
and  they  repped  and  warranted  to  Sam  Goody  or  whoever  was  the  distributor,  “Don’t 
worry  about  it;  I’ve  cleared  all  the  rights.”  They  wouldn’t  do  that  for  digital  distribution. 
That’s  why  my  clients  are  stuck  having  to  clear  the  publishing  rights  and  have  no  idea 
who  owns  the  publishing  rights,  especially  for  the  new  releases. 
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MR.  CHISICK:  Before  we  shift  gears  in  a  few  minutes  to  the  black  box,  is  there 
anybody  in  the  audience  who  wants  to  get  in  on  this  fun?  Now  is  the  time.  Put  up  your 
hands  and  we’ll  call  on  you. 
QUESTION  [Lauri  Rechardt,  IFPI,  London]:  A  question  for  Ken.  You  said  that  it 
is  impossible  for  the  services  to  get  licenses.  But  the  services  get  the  licenses  outside  the 
United  States.  As  someone  said,  the  United  States  is  the  outlier.  So  can  you  elaborate 
about  the  impossibility? 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  If  you  are  talking  about  the  label  licenses,  yes,  we  get  label 
licenses. 
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Rechardt]:  No,  publishing.  Of  course  with  respect  to  labels, 
as  you  know,  everything  works  on  the  basis  of  direct  licensing. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  On  the  publishing  side,  yes,  the  major  services  will  go  and 
seek  direct  licenses  from  the  largest  music  publishers,  but  they  absolutely  rely  on  the 
effective  compulsory  licensing  under  Section  115  for  mechanicals,  under  the 
ASCAP/BMI  consent  decrees  and  licenses.  They  rely  on  those  for  the  long  tail.  The  “long 
tail”  is  the  term  for  the  90  percent  of  the  music  out  there  that  constitutes  10  percent  of  the 
plays. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Ken  may  be  being  asked  —  and  he  may  not  want  to  answer  — 
why  in  other  countries  without  statutory  damages  Spotify  will  do  a  deal  with  the  big 
music  publishers  but  doesn’t  worry  about  it  if  deals  aren’t  done  everywhere. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  I  can’t  answer  that.  I  just  don’t  know. 
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Rechardt]:  The  point,  Ken,  is  that  outside  the  United  States 
these  compulsory  licenses  do  not  exist  and  yet  all  the  music  is  available  and  the  deals  are 
being  done. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  But  all  the  music  is  available  because  there  aren’t  statutory 
damages.  If  you  don’t  have  statutory  damages,  it’s  a  lot  easier  to  put  up  stuff  that  maybe 
you’re  not  100  percent  sure  you've  got  the  rights  to. 
QUESTIONER  [Mr.  Rechardt]:  It’s  all  seems  a  little  bit  speculative  to  me. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  The  statutory  damages  issue  is  a  pervasive  issue,  and  it’s  the 
answer  to  a  lot  of  the  questions  as  to  why  we  need  compulsory  licensing. 
MR.  CHISICK:  I  want  to  shift  gears  and  talk  about  the  black  box,  but  before  I  do 
Richard  just  wants  to  let  you  know  that  there  are  copies  —  well,  go  ahead. 
MR.  REIMER:  There  are  copies  of  the  ASCAP/BMI  open  letter,  in  case  anyone’s 
interested  in  reading  it. 
MR.  CHISICK:  Justin,  you  mentioned  the  black  box  issue,  so  why  don’t  you 
introduce  the  issue  again  and  let’s  talk  about  that? 
PROF.  HUGHES:  The  black  box  issue  is  simply  about  the  royalties  that  are 
sitting  there  where  you  might  have  a  name  but  you  can’t  identify  sufficiently  who  to  pay. 
The  question  is:  what  do  you  do  with  them,  and  when  do  you  do  what  you  do  with  them, 
and  how  long  do  you  let  them  sit?  For  example,  Spotify  in  one  of  its  class  actions  —  I 
think  it  was  a  class  action  over  $200  million  —  agreed  to  a  settlement  of  $43  million,  but  9
9  See  Ferrick  v.  Spotify  USA  Inc.,  No.  16-CV-8412  (AJN),  2018  WL  2324076,  at  *6 
(S.D.N.Y.  May  22,  2018),  appeal  dismissed  sub  nom.  Ferrick  v.  Diable,  No.  18-1702,  2018  WL 
6431410  (2d  Cir.  Oct.  9,  2018). 
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the  truth  of  that  settlement  is  the  $43  million  sits  with  Spotify  until  people  come  and 
collect  it. 
So  the  black  box  issue  is  one  that  divides,  as  I  understand  it,  the  contenders  to  be 
the  MLC.  There  are  accusations  that  the  contender  that  is  backed  by  SoundExchange  and 
the  National  Music  Publishers  Association  (NMPA)  would  adopt  a  mechanism  which, 
while  following  the  statute,  might  quickly  lead  to  the  uncommitted  and  unidentified  and 
uncollected  proceeds  and  royalties  going  to  the  big  majors,  going  to  the  major  publishers. 
The  American  Mechanical  Licensing  Collective  (AMLC)  proposal  would  have  greater 
efforts  to  figure  out  who  gets  the  proceeds  of  the  black  box. 
But  remember,  too,  that  the  size  of  the  black  box,  the  size  of  the  undistributed 
royalties,  depends  on  how  good  your  database  is.  If  your  database  is  better  and  better  and 
better,  the  size  of  the  undistributed  royalties  shrinks;  and  if  your  database  isn’t  so  hot,  the 
size  of  the  undistributed  royalties  grows.  So  the  problem  has  different  dimensions. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  Yes,  sure.  
First  of  all,  I’d  like  to  correct  the  notion  that  SoundExchange  is  somehow 
involved  with  the  MLC.  It’s  not.  The  MLC,  as  I  said,  was  founded  by  copyright  owners. 
The  Nashville  Songwriters  Association  International  (NSAI),  Songwriters  of  North 
America  (SONA),  and  NMPA  have  assisted  in  that  process.  SoundExchange  is  a  potential 
vendor,  as  are  several  other  potential  vendors,  including  HFA  and  Music  Reports.  There’s 
a  request-for-proposal  process  going  on  for  that. 
In  terms  of  the  so-called  “black  box,”  I  think  there  has  again  been  a  lot  of 
misinformation  that  has  been  spread. 
First  of  all,  as  you  said,  the  statute  already  has  certain  governance  requirements. 
The  statute  requires  the  board  of  the  MLC  to  contain  both  publisher  members  and 
songwriter  members.  Every  publisher  member  that  is  on  the  board  of  any  entity  that  is 
seeking  designation  as  the  collective  is  going  to  arguably  have  an  interest  in  the  black  box 
royalties  to  the  extent  that  any  ultimately  exist. 
Second,  in  terms  of  this  particular  MLC  that  my  firm  has  represented,  there  was  a 
process  where  a  songwriter  panel  vetted  and  selected  songwriters  for  MLC  board  seats. 
Songwriters  were  voted  on;  songwriters  were  selected  by  songwriters.  Publishers  were 
selected  by  publishers.  Most  of  the  publishers  on  the  board  are  actually  independent 
publishers;  in  fact,  the  Unclaimed  Royalties  Oversight  Committee  that  will  be  involved  in 
these  unclaimed  royalty  issues  is  made  up  exclusively  of  small  independent  publishers. 
So  things  are  being  done  to  ensure  that  everything  is  transparent  and  everything  is  done 
aboveboard. 
That  said,  also  as  I  said  before,  I  think  the  incentives  are  there  for  the  collective, 
whoever  is  chosen,  to  really  work  hard  to  match  as  many  songs  as  possible,  to  find  as 
many  copyright  owners  as  possible.  That’s  the  goal;  the  MLC  wants  to  have  everybody 
who  is  supposed  to  get  paid  be  paid,  and  be  paid  correctly. 
As  MLC  said  in  its  submission  to  the  Copyright  Office,  in  its  view  the  statute 
does  not  even  permit  the  collective  to  make  a  distribution  of  unclaimed  royalties  until 
2023,  and  the  MLC  doesn’t  even  necessarily  intend  to  do  so  then.  It  will  try  to  match  as 
many  works  as  possible,  find  as  many  copyright  owners  as  possible,  before  making  a 
distribution.  That’s  its  goal. 
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Of  course,  the  ability  to  do  that  will  depend  to  some  extent  on  the  funding,  so 
we’ve  got  to  make  sure  the  MLC  is  funded  so  that  it  can  do  the  important  tasks  that  it  is 
designated  to  do  under  the  statute. 
MR.  CHISICK:  What  is  the  matching  process  supposed  to  look  like?  Is  it  all  an 
internal  process?  Is  there  some  interface  with  the  public  outside  the  confines  of  the 
collective?  How  is  that  supposed  to  work  under  the  MLC  process? 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  There  is  supposed  to  be  a  public  database. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  The  statute  is  very  elaborate  in  all  the  ways  the  database  is 
supposed  to  be  public.  Presumably,  it  will  be  publicly  searchable  by  individual 
songwriters.  Because  it  is  searchable  by  individual  songwriters,  whoever  the  MLC  is,  all 
kinds  of  songwriter  organizations  should  do  massive  outreach  to  say,  “Once  it’s  up  and 
running,  get  on  there  and  find  out  if  your  stuff  is  there;  and,  if  your  stuff  isn’t  there, 
pursue  the  mechanism  to  get  it  corrected.” 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  But  just  remember  you  still  would  have  to  find  all  the 
sound  recordings.  So,  you  can  put  yourself  in  the  database  as  a  composer,  but  then  it 
sounds  like  the  onus  is  still  on  you  to  figure  out  all  the  sound  recordings.  That  can  be 
tough  with  people  around  the  world  making  random  recordings  all  the  time. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  Actually,  the  intention  is  to  have,  in  addition  to  a  database  that 
people  can  populate  with  their  rights  ownership  for  the  works  they  own,  a  claiming 
portal.  There  will  be  a  claiming  portal  for  the  sound  recordings  where  the  musical  works 
rights  owners  are  unknown  and  for  which  the  royalties  are  unallocated  and  not  yet  paid 
because  nobody  has  claimed  them.  Those  will  be  sound  recording-specific.  If  you  are 
somebody  who  thinks  you  might  have  a  claim  to  royalties,  you  could  go  to  that  portal  and 
make  a  claim. 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  I  don’t  disagree  with  that. 
MR.  CHISICK:  And  the  database  is  supposed  to  have  a  matching  mechanism 
from  the  sound  recording  to  the  composition  owners;  is  that  right? 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  Yes.  I  like  that  idea,  but  it’s  a  “wait  and  see”  to  see  if  it 
actually  works. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  When  I  said  SoundExchange,  I  was  actually  being 
complimentary  because  I  think  they’ve  done  a  better  job  than  most  of  the  database 
developers  I  have  seen.  Since  the  trick  is  not  just  to  have  an  authoritative  database  of 
musical  compositions  but  to  actually  connect  it  to  an  authoritative  database  of  sound 
recordings,  I  think  that  if  they  weren’t  in  the  puzzle,  I  would  wonder  why. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  The  reason  I  balked  is  because  certain  publications,  to  be 
unnamed,  appear  to  have  made  the  assumption  that  this  is  a  predetermined  process,  that 
SoundExchange  has  been  preselected,  when  it  in  fact  has  not. 
MR.  CHISICK:  I  think  the  way  the  black  box  money  is  dealt  with  is  the  source  of 
a  lot  of  the  controversy.  One  of  the  criticisms  that  I  have  read  said  that  distributing  black 
box  money  according  to  market  share  to  music  publishers  is  precisely  the  inverse 
situation  to  what  it  ought  to  be,  because  then  the  royalties  that  are  least  likely  to  be 
claimed  are  the  royalties  that  are  attributable  to  long-tail  compositions  that  will  not 
necessarily  belong  to  music  publishers. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  The  Sean  O’Connor  works,  for  example. 
MR.  CHISICK:  To  Sean  O’Connor. 
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PROF.  HUGHES:  I  think  he’s  doing  well. 
MR.  CHISICK:  Is  that  a  fair  criticism;  and,  if  so,  how  can  it  be  dealt  with 
differently? 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  In  a  way,  isn’t  that  what  happens  with  radio  now? 
MR.  CHISICK:  Yes. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Yes.  That’s  a  good  idea  then. 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  No,  no,  no.  I’m  trying  to  be  fair.  Look,  I’m  trying  to  be 
objective  here.  I  agree,  but  I’m  saying  that  is  the  same  criticism  we  had  with  radio  for  a 
long  time,  too. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  First  of  all,  the  statute  is  set  up  that  way.  But  what’s  the 
alternative,  to  let  Spotify  keep  it? 
MR.  CHISICK:  I  don’t  know.  
PROF.  HUGHES:  Actually,  I  can  give  you  an  alternative.  One  alternative  would 
be,  instead  of  it  getting  distributed  to  the  music  publishers,  the  money  should  be  sent  to 
music  education  programs  in  magnet  schools  around  the  country. 
I  don’t  say  that  flippantly.  There  was  a  very  early  moment  in  1998,  when  the 
copyright  extension  was  being  discussed  —  it  was  not  very  public,  and  it  won’t  be;  none 
of  you  will  tell,  right?  —  when  the  White  House  seriously  considered  that  some  of  the 
proceeds  would  have  to  go  to  the  National  Endowment  for  the  Arts. 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  I  think  that’s  a  good  idea. 
But  I  want  to  go  back  to  my  thing  about  “fair  trade  certified”  again.  Let  me  give 
another  perspective  as  somebody  who  does  still  record  —  not  well.  If  you  are  working  in 
Pro  Tools  —  and  any  musician  in  the  room  will  know  this  —  when  you  are  doing  the 
final  bounce-down  (after  you  have  recorded  a  bunch  of  tracks,  you  mix  it  down,  you 
bounce  it  down)  you  put  metadata  in  that  file  you  generate.  Everyone  who  is  recording  in 
a  digital  native  medium  is  putting  in  metadata.  The  question  is,  what  happens  to  that 
stuff;  where  does  it  go? 
Again,  I  think  that  we  really  should  be  focusing  on,  whether  it’s  mandated 
through  statute  or  somehow  regulatory  or  a  private  ordering,  is  to  come  together  and 
figure  this  out  and  negotiate  it.  A  lot  of  the  major  digital  music  service  providers  should 
think  about  adopting  this.  It’s  kind  of  a  win-win  all  around. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  But,  Sean,  let  me  ask  you  a  question.  First  of  all,  does  the 
designation  of  the  metadata  really  guide  you  on  the  type  of  metadata?  Second,  you  just 
moved  across  the  country,  didn’t  you? 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  I  did. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  So  is  the  metadata  accurate  on  all  those?  
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  Location  you  don’t  really  worry  about.  I  don’t  worry  about 
that.  Location  is  not  one  of  the  normal  categories.  The  normal  categories  are  genre,  artist, 
composer. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Right.  But  the  problem  is  we  might  know  the  names  of  a  lot  of 
artists  but  we  simply  just  don’t  know  how  to  find  them.  We  know  the  names  of  a  lot  of 
songwriters  but  we  can’t  find  them.  
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  But  if  the  database  is  successful,  someone  like  me,  a  very 
small-time  songwriter,  could  go  and  put  my  name  in  there.  What  I’m  saying  then  is  if 
there  are  any  recordings  out  there  that  list  me  as  the  songwriter,  now  I  can  match  it  up. 
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I’m  not  disagreeing  that  the  songwriters  have  some  work  to  do,  but  I’m  saying 
that  we  all  have  to  meet  each  other  halfway  on  this  and  make  it  possible. 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  To  some  degree,  the  recordings  that  are  in  the  unallocated  or 
unmatched  royalty  database  may  not  be  completely  divorced  in  terms  of  copyright 
ownership  from  the  people  or  the  entities  who  are  going  to  be  sharing  in  the  unallocated 
royalties.  Like  Kenny  said,  sometimes  things  get  thrown  up  there  on  the  Internet  — 
maybe  it’s  a  cover  of  a  Billy  Joel  song  —  that  doesn’t  mean  that  Universal  doesn’t  own 
that  recording,  but  it  just  hasn’t  been  cleared  to  the  point  that  it  has  been  designated  as  a 
Billy  Joel  song. 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  Yes. 
MR.  CHISICK:  The  concern  that  Kenny  was  expressing  earlier  —  and  it’s  a 
concern  you  hear  a  lot  —  is  that  these  songs  are  released  at  a  time  when  the  ownership 
splits  haven’t  been  determined.  It’s  easy  if  you  are  writing  and  recording  your  own  music 
and  there’s  one  songwriter.  It’s  not  so  easy  if  you  have  ten  or  fourteen  co-writers  on  an 
urban  music  composition,  for  example,  which  is  common. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  It’s  often  not  even  agreed.  In  other  words,  the  writers  have 
disputes  among  themselves  over  who  is  going  to  get  what  split,  and  it  takes  a  while  to 
sort  itself  out. 
PROF.  O’CONNOR:  I  agree.  
One  question  I  have  is,  who  is  the  onus  on  to  update  the  database  when  there  is 
either  outright  litigation,  and  then  we  realize  we  have  to  add  somebody  else,  or  it  gets 
settled  before  finalized  and  we  add  another  songwriter? 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  The  beauty  of  the  statute  is  that  it  creates  the  flow  of  money 
into  the  collective  while  those  disputes  are  being  resolved. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Yes,  and  that  is  different  from  the  old  system  statutorily. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  Correct. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  I  have  a  question  for  Richard.  I  know  from  talking  to  you  guys 
that  you  will  frequently  have  the  band  come  and  say,  “We’re  going  to  list  all  of  us  as  on 
the  composition,  and  Bob  gets  20  percent  and  Jessica  gets  40  percent.”  How  long  does  it 
take  between  the  release  of  a  record  with  new  musical  compositions  and  when  you 
actually  have  that  at  the  PRO? 
MR.  REIMER:  It  could  take  weeks;  it  could  take  months.  But  in  the  PRO  world 
we  are  distributing  current  moneys  based  on  performances  that  occurred  six  months  prior. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Right,  right,  right. 
MR.  REIMER:  So  we  have  the  time  to  sort  it  all  out.  
PROF.  HUGHES:  You  have  the  time  lag. 
MR.  REIMER:  Yes. 
MR.  CHISICK:  I  come  from  a  jurisdiction  where  a  lot  of  what  is  in  the  MMA 
has  been  tried  as  part  of  a  private  settlement  of  a  different  problem,  which  was  the 
pending  and  unmatched  royalties  in  the  physical  world,  with  a  public  claims  process, 
with  the  reproduction  right  collectives  —  Canadian  Musical  Reproduction  Rights  Agency 
(CMRRA)  and  Society  for  Reproduction  Rights  of  Authors,  Composers,  and  Publishers 
in  Canada  (SODRAC)  —  jointly  administering  a  claims  process  and  finally  a  market 
share  distribution. 
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It’s  interesting  that  you  hear  all  of  these  accusations  that  the  publishers  are 
somehow  self-interested  —  and  you  can  understand  why  the  criticism  is  there  —  but  in 
practice  an  enormous  amount  of  the  money  that  had  not  been  distributed  was  distributed 
to  the  rightholders  because  there  was  suddenly  an  incentive  to  do  that.  The  collecting 
societies,  which  are  controlled  by  songwriters  and  publishers,  have  managed  to  do  a 
pretty  good  job  of  doing  that  before  the  market  share  distribution  occurred.  So  part  of  me 
wonders  why  there  is  the  concern  that  this  model  cannot  be  replicated  in  the  United 
States. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  I  think  the  goal  is  to  replicate  that  model. 
MR.  CHISICK:  I  understand.  But  we’re  hearing  all  of  this  ruckus  about  the 
publishers  conspiring  to  keep  the  money  out  of  the  hands  of  the  people  who  deserve  it. 
That  is  inconsistent  with  what  I’ve  seen. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  From  the  services’  perspective  it’s  the  publishers'  and  the 
songwriters’  problem.  We  want  to  put  the  money  in  and  let  them  figure  out  how  to 
distribute  it. 
One  of  the  other  things  we  haven’t  talked  about  that  is  a  huge  problem  is,  what  is 
the  cost  of  this  collective  going  to  be?  How  is  the  money  going  to  be  raised  to  fund  this 
very,  very  expensive  undertaking?  The  MLC  and  AMLC  had  fundamentally  different 
cost  propositions  advanced  as  to  what  this  database  was  going  to  cost.  The  services  are 
not  going  write  a  blank  check,  although  they  are  going  to  have  to  write  a  big  check.  That 
is  a  big  issue  that  is  going  to  be  litigated  probably  over  the  course  of  the  next  year. 
MR.  CHISICK:  Does  anybody  want  to  address  the  question  of  cost? 
PROF.  HUGHES:  I  think  it  should  be  low.  That’s  one  reason  why  I  spoke  highly 
of  SoundExchange.  If  you  start  with  that,  you  have  half  the  data  already  pretty 
authoritatively,  and  I  think  the  cost  should  be  fairly  low. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  There  are  vendors  out  there  —  Harry  Fox  and  MRI  have 
been  mentioned  in  this  panel  —  the  Society  of  Composers,  Authors,  and  Music 
Publishers  of  Canada  (SOCAN);  and  I  think  SESAC  is  now  affiliated  with  Harry  Fox  — 
and  there  have  been  investments  made  by  these  companies  that  manage  the  lion’s  share  of 
this  data.  The  question  is  how  to  aggregate  it  all  into  one  place  and  then  sort  through  the 
data,  to  have  a  common  way  of  processing  it.  It  shouldn’t  be  as  expensive  as  one  of  the 
collectives  said  it  would  likely  be. 
PROF.  HUGHES:  Right.  My  last  thing  is  that  some  of  the  cost  might  actually  just 
be  the  cost  of  political  compromise,  not  the  cost  of  a  real  market.  I  am  very  concerned 
that  the  database  we  should  go  for  is  the  most  authoritative  and  the  best,  not  the  political 
compromise  database. 
MR.  STEINTHAL:  Hear,  hear! 
MR.  SCIBILIA:  Yes. 
We  talked  today  a  lot  about  a  lot  of  the  things  that  the  collective  has  to  do, 
especially  if  they  want  to  do  it  well,  including  finding  the  songwriters  and  matching  the 
data  to  make  sure  the  right  people  are  getting  paid. 
The  collective  is  a  brand-new  entity  with  a  host  of  statutory  responsibilities, 
which  are  set  out  in  the  Act  at  Section  115(d)(3)(C)(i).  The  collective’s  responsibilities 
include: 
•  Offering  and  administering  blanket  licenses; 
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•  Collecting  and  distributing  royalties;  
•  Matching  and  identifying  musical  works  in  sound  recordings  (including  manual 
efforts)  and  locating  copyright  owners; 
•  Maintaining  and  updating  the  rights  database,  including  the  transfer  of  rights; 
•  Administering  the  ownership  claiming  process  and  managing  the  claiming 
portal; 
•  Administering  the  collections  of  the  administrative  assessment  and  participating 
in  assessment  proceedings;  
•  Engaging  in  and  responding  to  audits  and  filing  bankruptcy  claims;  
•  Reporting  to  stakeholders,  including  in  annual  and  other  reports;  
•  Managing  disputes,  including  split  disputes,  for  millions  of  works;  and 
•  Monitoring  and  enforcing  compliance  with  the  terms  of  the  license  and  the 
statute  and  its  implementing  regulations,  including  accurate  calculation  of  royalty  pools 
and  rates  and  defaults  in  licensee  reporting.  
You  cannot  compare  the  collective’s  costs  to  what  one  service  might  pay  to  one 
vendor  today  because  the  collective  will  be  engaging  in  nationwide  activities  on  behalf  of 
all  blanket  licenses  and  significant  non-blanket  licenses,  and  not  just  for  streaming  but 
also  downloading.  The  scale  is  exponentially  larger.  
If  you  look  at  what  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  budgeted  for  this  —  and 
they  had  experts  look  at  this  —  they  said  it  was  going  to  cost  roughly  $30  million  per 
year.  10
I  think  it’s  natural  for  the  services  to  want  to  pay  less  because  they  are  going  to 
be  funding  it.  But,  at  the  same  time,  they  have  to  make  sure  that  the  collective  is  not 
underfunded,  because  if  it’s  underfunded,  it  can’t  perform  its  duties;  where,  on  the  other 
hand,  if  it’s  overfunded,  it’s  not  really  a  problem  because  the  collective  can  just  apply  any 
excess  to  the  next  period. 
Also,  given  that  one  of  the  collective’s  duties  is  enforcement  with  respect  to 
accounting  and  payment  by  the  services,  one  has  to  ask  whether  the  services  might 
benefit  from  underfunding  because  if  the  collective  is  underfunded,  it  would  be  less  able 
to  engage  in  these  statutorily  required  enforcement  efforts. 
I  also  think  any  discussion  of  the  costs  of  the  collective  to  the  services  should 
also  be  tied  to  a  discussion  of  the  benefits  of  the  collective  to  the  services,  in  particular, 
the  ability  to  obtain  a  blanket  license  and  the  limitation  on  liability  from  hundreds  of 
millions  of  dollars  in  statutory  damages  provided  they  follow  statutory  procedure.  
The  MMA  struck  a  bargain.  The  services  wanted  the  limitation  on  liability  and 
they  wanted  the  ease  and  the  protection  of  the  blanket  license.  To  obtain  those  benefits 
they  agreed  to  fund  the  collective.  Now  they  seem  to  want  the  benefits  but  without  the 
burden. 
MR.  CHISICK:  So  you  see,  as  I  said  at  the  beginning,  consensus,  everybody’s 
happy,  it’s  working  out  great,  and  we  are  all  looking  forward  to  seeing  how  it  pans  out. 
[Laughter] 
10  See,  e.g. ,  Cong.  Budget  Office,  S.  2823  Music  Modernization  Act  Cost  Estimate  3 
(2018),  https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2018-09/s2823.pdf. 
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Thank  you  to  the  panelists  for  a  fantastic  discussion.  Thank  you  to  Fordham  for 
hosting  us. 
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